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Abstract In this paper I respond to Coren’s argument against my 2016 paper in
which I present a case for the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not
necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility (PAP(S)). I concede that Coren has
identified aspects of my original position that are vulnerable to counter-examples.
Nevertheless, through a simple amendment to my original argument I am able to
respond to these counter-examples without undermining the foundations on which my
2016 paper was built. Moreover, it is my contention that the main challenge Coren
presents to my original paper involves making explicit that which is already implied
within PAP(S). Therefore, while I acknowledge that my argument for PAP(S) requires
further clarification, this can be achieved (as I demonstrate here) without undermining
my original position.
Keywords Unequivocally and equivocally immoral/moral . Contextualizedmoral
claims .Moral inverse . Twinworld congruence
In Young (2016), I present the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) as a sufficient
but not necessary condition for the ascription of moral responsibility. PAP(s) reads as
follows: A person is morally responsible for what they have done if they could have
done otherwise. I further stipulate that for the ascription of moral responsibility at least
one alternate possibility must be morally praiseworthy or at the very least not immoral.
Coren raises two objections to PAP(s). I intend to respond to each in turn, but will focus
on Case 1 of Objection 1 which I discuss at length. I will then discuss Case 2, briefly,
before moving on to Objection 2, Case 3.
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Through Objection 1, Coren seeks to amend PAP(s)’s requirement for an alternate
possibility – from something that would appear to be categorical (i.e., morally praise-
worthy or at the very least not immoral in some absolute sense) to something more
relative – by arguing that the relationship between what is selected (E) and the
alternative(s) (other than E) must be such that E is clearly morally superior or inferior
to ‘other than E’, rather than being moral or immoral per se. Thus, the amended PAP(s)
(presented as PAP(s)*) states:
PAP(s)* =df S is morally responsible and thus praiseworthy or blameworthy for E
if S could have done something clearly morally superior or clearly morally
inferior to E. (Coren 2017, p.6)
In response, I argue that PAP(s)* presents more formally a relationships
between alternate possibilities that further analysis reveals PAP(s) already accom-
modates, at least when Young’s (2016) requirement for alternate possibilities is
explained in more detail and amended slightly in response to Coren’s comments
(this slight amendment also enables PAP(s) to accommodate the objection raised
by Case 2 of Objection 1). Therefore, while I accept that PAP(s)* provides some
clarity (although not absolute) which, by comparison, PAP(s) lacks – insofar as I
concede that PAP(s) may give the impression that it requires or postulates
categorical moral claims, even though it does neither – I do not accept that
PAP(s)* overcomes alleged problems inherent within PAP(s) because I believe
that PAP(s) is able to accommodate the challenges Coren presents in Objection 1,
as I intend to show.
At the risk of pre-empting my argument, I believe PAP(s) is able to resist the
challenges posed by Objection 1 because I take the fact that PAP(s)* stipulates that E
must be clearly morally superior or clearly morally inferiors to mean that PAP(s)*
employs the same reasoning as PAP(s). To explain: if satisfying PAP(s)* requires that E
is clearly morally superior or inferior to ‘other than E’, then the term ‘clearly’ would
seem to denote a difference in kind, rather than degree. On the other hand, if E is
meant to differ simply by degree then PAP(s)* needs to articulate this requirement in a
less ambiguous way (as ‘clearly’ is not clear enough). Distinguishing E from ‘other
than E’ is essentially what the original PAP(s) is doing with reference to outcomes that
are identified as ‘moral’ relative to outcomes that are considered ‘immoral’. Applying
these contrasting moral labels is therefore a way of clearly demarcating between
outcomes whilst also identifying one outcome as morally superior or inferior to
another (where this is found to be the case, of course). In short, given that the same
reasoning is applied, it is my contention that PAP(s) provides not only a legitimate
means of ascribing moral responsibility to S but does so in a manner compatible with
PAP(s)*.
In Objection 2, Coren argues that PAP(s) lacks the same intuitive appeal as the
original PAP. In response, I argue that PAP(s) maintains some of this intuitive appeal but
also that our intuition needs to take account of the subtle difference between acknowl-
edging that one could have done otherwise on a given occasion and the role alternate
possibilities can play even when one could not have done otherwise on a given
occasion. Coren also seeks clarification regarding my use of ‘congruence’ in the
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TwinWorld Condition (TWC), which I attempt to provide through, among other things,
a response to his Case 3 objection.
1 Response to Objection 1
1.1 Case 1
Coren’s first objection is said to demonstrate how PAP(s) ascribes moral responsibility
to individuals in cases where we would not intuitively expect it; it is therefore too
broad. This objection is presented using two vignettes in the form of Case 1 and Case 2.
Case 1 reads as follows:
Case 1: A train is approaching and will continue quickly down one of two tracks.
On Track A there are 25 people tied up. On Track B there are 26 people tied up. If
S flips a switch conveniently located beside S then the train goes down B. If not,
it goes down A. S must choose to either flip the switch or not (mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive options). S knows all of this and decides to not flip the
switch. (Coren 2017, pp.3–4)
According to Case 1, S can do one of two things: either flick the switch (the ‘action’
option), or not flick the switch (the ‘inaction’ option). One consequence of S’s action or
inaction (or, if you like, one event that would transpire because of what S does) can be
described in terms of the number of people killed. By choosing the ‘action’ option, a
group of 26 people would be killed. Conversely, by choosing ‘inaction’, a different
group of 25 people would be killed. Importantly, though, either description only
partially captures what would occur as a consequence of S’s action or inaction. In
addition, if S decides to flick the switch (‘action’ option), 25 people are not killed by
the train. Likewise, 26 people are not killed if S does nothing (‘inaction’ option).
Intuitively, each of these partial outcomes can be given the following moral status
(ceteris paribus):
& Allowing 25 people to be killed is immoral
& Allowing 26 people to be killed is immoral
& Not allowing 25 people to be killed is morally good
& Not allowing 26 people to be killed is morally good
Of course, the possible events Case 1 permits do not just involve 25 or 26 people
being killed (depending on what S allows to happen); nor do they just involve 25 or 26
people not being killed. Instead, the event Case 1 actually describes is 25 people being
killed alongside 26 people being saved; although it could have described the opposite,
should S have chosen otherwise. I have captured each of these co-occurrences below in
relation to the two options available to S:
1. Action (flicking the switch): Allows more people to be killed than are saved
2. Inaction (not flicking the switch): Allows more people to be saved than are killed
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According to PAP(s), S being able to do otherwise is sufficient for S to be ascribed
moral responsibility; and as Coren points out, S is able to do otherwise (i.e., action or
inaction). More specifically, S satisfies the following conditions:
(a) It is possible for S to do otherwise insofar as S is both physically and mentally
capable of doing otherwise (including being aware of alternate possibilities that he
is able to select/perform).
(b) All external conditions required to enable alternate possibilities are satisfied.
But, as already noted in Young (2016), I also stipulate the following for the
ascription of moral responsibility, which Coren acknowledges:
[T]he notion of ‘alternate possibilities’ should be understood to mean that there is
at least one alternate possibility that is considered morally praiseworthy, or at the
very least not immoral. (p.964)
With Case 1, it is true that (a) and (b) are satisfied. Nevertheless, do the options
available to S allow an outcome that is morally praiseworthy or at the very least not
immoral?
(i) S’s action (flicking the switch) allows more people to be killed than are saved.
Unequivocally, I would say that this is an immoral outcome (ceteris paribus)
If the two groups differ only in terms of their size then allowing the larger group to
be killed cannot be justified, morally.
(ii) S’s inaction allows more people to be saved than are killed. The morality of this
outcome is, I accept, equivocal.
With (ii), one could say that it is a morally good outcome because more people are
saved than are killed; although I accept that one might question how it could be so
given the number of people killed (some might view the event as a kind of Pyrrhic
victory). That said, the fact that more people are saved than are killed makes it hard to
justify (I would argue) classifying the outcome as immoral. Given this, PAP(s)’s
requirement for alternate possibilities is satisfied: because the possible outcome de-
scribed in (ii) is not immoral. That said, I shall now attempt to justify why S’s inaction
should be seen as allowing a moral outcome, not merely one that is not immoral (a
move that is also compatible with the slight amendment I intend to make to my
definition of alternate possibilities).
1.2 S’s Inaction Allows a morally Praiseworthy (Qua morally Good or Correct)
Outcome
Consider how Coren describes S’s inaction:
…[I]n Case 1, the best thing that S could have done is to allow 25 people to be
killed: S’s two options were the only options (jointly exhaustive of the domain of
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possibilities). But we probably would not want to praise S for allowing 25 people
to be killed by not pulling a switch. Nor, I suspect, would we blame S for doing
what was S’s best option available. (Coren 2017, p.4; emphasis in original)
When Coren refers to S’s inaction as the best thing he could have done, he is not
implying that it was unequivocally the best thing to have done but, rather, that it is the
best thing under the circumstances. I take this to mean ‘given the alternative’. The
alternative, in this case, amounts to an unequivocally immoral outcome: namely,
allowing more people to be killed than were saved. Allowing more people to be saved
than were killed is therefore a morally superior outcome to the alternative, and this is
the point Coren’s is making. I do not disagree with Coren, here. Instead, I wish merely
to demonstrate that what Coren makes explicit through PAP(s)*, is a relational quality
that PAP(s) already endorses, only tacitly so.
To see how, first consider a further comment made by Coren in addition to claiming
that S’s inaction was the best thing to do: that it is likely that we would not want to
praise S for allowing 25 people to be killed, but nor should we blame him for this. What
Coren seems to be suggesting with this comment is that the outcome of S’s inaction is
not in and of itself morally praiseworthy, although it is morally superior to the
alternative (the outcome of S’s action). Thus, for Coren, the outcome of S’s inaction
is not deserving of moral praise but is morally superior to the alternative (an alternative
I have argued is unequivocally immoral). Hence, it is the best option available to S.
If this is the case then the two options available to S are as follows: one whose
outcome is immoral (the ‘action’ option) and one whose outcome is not morally
praiseworthy but is morally superior to the immoral alternative (the ‘inaction’ option),
which I will assume raises it above the level of immoral (although see discussion below
on a ‘Sophie’s choice’ situation for an example of where this is not the case). Given
this, according to PAP(s), S should be ascribed moral responsibility. So how should we
judge S? I agree that we should not blame S for choosing inaction. But if we are not to
praise him, either (as Coren suggests), then what are we left to do: just shrug our
shoulders? If this were the case then PAP(s) would be in trouble, as Coren claims.
What I aim to show is that the outcome of S’s inaction can, and in fact should, be
identified as morally praiseworthy (although not unequivocally so), and that the
justification for claiming a morally praiseworthy outcome is based on the same
‘relativity’ requirement PAP(s)* expresses. In other words, it is my contention that in
order to acquire the status of moral praiseworthiness (and justifiably so), the moral
status of the outcome of S’s inaction must be contextualized relative to the status of the
outcome of S’s action (which amounts to ‘other than E’, in this case); and while this
relativity is not expressed within the formulation of PAP(s), it is nevertheless the means
by which the moral status of a particular outcome is determined (although see below for
a caveat in the case of unequivocal moral claims).
To be clear on this point, for the ascription of moral responsibility, where an
outcome (E) is considered either morally praiseworthy or immoral, there must always
be a possible alternate outcome that is not equivalent to this. But the moral status of E
does not have to be unequivocally moral or immoral; rather, E need only be moral or
immoral relative to the alternate possibility or possibilities available. Where an outcome
is judged to be unequivocally moral or immoral then it must be ascribed this status not
just relative to the alternate possibilities available but to all alternate possibilities,
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whether available or not. Thus, with regard to Case 1, when I said that (ceteris paribus)
allowing more people to be killed than are saved is unequivocally immoral, for this to
be so, there must be no possible outcome that this outcome is morally superior to. In the
case of S’s inaction, it is my contention that the outcome allowed by S not flicking the
switch is not unequivocally moral – because it is not morally superior to all alternate
possibilities – but it is morally superior to all of the alternatives available.
What I am saying here is not strictly in accordance with the definition of alternate
possibilities presented in Young (2016), which I originally formulated (carelessly, I
accept) within the context of describing an alternate possibility to an immoral outcome
only. Coren presents an example that shows the original definition to be problematic,
but not insurmountably so. The amendment I make therefore maintains the spirit of
what I originally intended, but is not restricted to describing alternatives to immoral
outcomes.
To illustrate Coren’s objection: suppose S does something morally praiseworthy but,
as it turns out, all of his options allow a morally praiseworthy outcome. In such a
situation, should S be ascribed moral responsibility? After all, he could not have done
other than he did, which was to act morally. I concede that the definition of alternate
possibilities found in Young (2016) would require that S be ascribed moral responsibil-
ity and, given the moral praiseworthiness of each available outcome, be praised for what
he did (recall that the original definition requires that at least one alternate possibility be
morally praiseworthy or at the very least not immoral; something which is satisfied
here). Given the validity of Coren’s objection, I suggest amending the definition of
alternate possibilities to the following: At least one alternate possibility must be avail-
able that is the moral inverse of whatever else is available. As noted, this amendment
retains the spirit of what I intended in the original version (which was discussed in the
context of an immoral outcome) but is able to overcome the objection just raised. When
defined in this new way, S should not be ascribed moral responsibility.1
With this amendment in mind, and in order to justify the claims that I have been
making, we need to understand that allowing 25 people to be killed is a partial outcome
of S’s inaction. As noted previously, in and of itself, I consider (intuitively) allowing 25
people to be killed an immoral thing to happen. Therefore, if this was the sole
consequence of S’s inaction then, of course, S should not be morally praised for
allowing such a thing to occur. But this is not the full extent of the outcome we are
judging: for this is not the full (immediate) consequence allowed by S’s inaction. The
full consequence is that S’s inaction allowed more people to be saved than were killed,
and this remains the case relative to the only available alternate possibility. It is for this
reason that I believe Coren describes S’s inaction as the best thing he could have done
(under the circumstances). Now, if it is the best thing he could have done, is it not the
correct thing to have done (under the circumstances)? If it is the correct thing to have
done then, given the moral relevance of the outcome, is it not the morally correct thing
to have done?
1 To ascribe morally responsibility to S in this scenario, the Twin World Condition (TWC) would need to be
taken into account (yet to be discuss here). Only if S’s action was found to be congruent in W1 and W2 (where
W2 contains at least one option that has an inverse moral outcome to any other), should S be ascribed moral
responsibility and, in this case, praised. Should S’s action in each world instead be incongruent (insofar as an
immoral outcome was selected in W2) then S should not be ascribed moral responsibility in W1 nor praised in
W2.
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The moral status of an outcome will shift depending on the context in which it is
placed: that is, relative to the alternatives. To borrow an example from Coren: suppose S
could have diverted the train onto a third track on which no one was tied. As a result, no
one was killed. In this context, diverting the train to the third track allows for a morally
superior outcome compared to the two other options. That said, S’s inaction, which would
allow 25 people to be killed, is still morally superior to diverting the train towards the 26
people on the other track, but in the context we are now discussing should deservedly be
said to have allowed an immoral outcome given the new alternate outcome available.
Coren equates the original Case 1 (involving only two options) with the following
scenario: imaging a driver whose only options are to steer left and kill a pedestrian,
steer straight and do the same, or steer right and, again, kill a pedestrian. Given that
there is no morally-relevant way of distinguishing between the pedestrians, each
outcome is immoral. This, however, is not the case with Case 1, so they are not
equivalent examples. According to PAP(s), which includes the amended definition of
alternate possibilities introduced earlier, the driver cannot be ascribed moral responsi-
bility. There is, of course, a further means of ascribing moral responsibility to the
driver: the Twin World Condition (TWC), which I also introduce in Young (2016).
TWC: Where S’s action E in world W1 (a world without alternate possibilities,
owing to the possibility of intervention) and S’s action E in twin world W2 (which
differs from W1 only insofar as it is a world with alternate possibilities) are
congruent then S in either world is morally responsible for E.
The driver in the scenario just described resides in W1 (a world without
alternate possibilities that are not immoral). Comparing the driver in W1 with
the equivalent driver in W2 who is able to steer down a fourth road without
pedestrians (and therefore inhabits a world with at least one alternate possibility
that is not immoral), should the driver’s action in W2 be congruent with that of
W1 then the driver should be ascribed morally responsibility and blamed for her
action. Where the action of the driver in W2 is incongruent with W1 (insofar as
she selects the only moral option) then the driver should not be ascribed moral
responsibility in W1. Importantly, then, and to reiterate, Case 1 (involving S
and the two options) is not equivalent to the driver in W1 because, in Case 1,
unlike the driver in W1, S has an option available to him that, in the circum-
stance permitted, is moral, even if not unequivocally so.
By acknowledging that S did the best thing, perhaps we need to bite the bullet and
accept that S did the morally correct thing because he allowed more people to be saved
than were killed. Of course, the 26 people would have remained ‘not killed’ even if S
had not been at the scene (given that S did not flick the switch to change the direction of
the train). But this does not make the ‘non-killing of 26 people’ a non-event. Given that
S was at the scene, it still features as part of one of two possible outcomes against
which S should ultimately be judged given that PAP(s)’s criteria were met. Thus, if we
accept that saving more people than were killed is a morally good thing to have
occurred, especially compared to the alternative of killing more than were saved then
we have a morally praiseworthy alternative, which is a sufficient requirement for
PAP(s). Importantly, though, and without fear of contradiction, one should be able to
say S did the morally correct thing while also claiming that the killing of 25 people was
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not a morally good thing to have happened (certainly we would not want to praise S for
this aspect of the full event that transpired, as Coren states). That said, doing the
morally correct thing (when the full outcome is evaluated) deserves moral praise;
although, perhaps in the context we are discussing, the notion of moral praiseworthi-
ness – as in, singing S’s praises for what he did – could, I accept, be construed as
somewhat insensitive, given the tragic deaths that also occurred. But this should not
detract from the fact that, in doing the best thing possible under the circumstances, S
can be said to have done the morally correct thing.
The use of the term ‘moral praiseworthiness’ (or similar) I concede perhaps gives an
unwanted sense of heaping praise on someone for their action (or inaction, in S’s case).
What I mean by my use of this term, however, which is also the case in Young (2016),
is that a particular outcome constitutes a morally good thing to have occurred. In Case
1, where inaction is interpreted as allowing a morally praiseworthy (qua morally
correct) outcome, and therefore where an alternate possibility (as defined) is available
to S, then S should be ascribed moral responsibility in accordance with PAP(s). Where S
(whether through action or inaction) allows what is deemed to be the morally correct
outcome to occur then S should be morally praised for his action which, minimally,
should be to acknowledge that S has done the morally correct thing.
How does what I have just said differ from what is expressed by PAP(s)*? There is
no fundamental difference; and this is my point. In order to establish the moral status of
an outcome (E), one must do so relative to the alternate possibilities available. E’s status
should therefore be contextualized (its status is established relative to a particular set of
circumstances), unless the moral status is unequivocal, of course, in which case E’s
moral status must be established relative to all possible outcomes. However, and
importantly, judging that E is morally superior to an available alternate possibility does
not necessarily make it something that one ought to identify as a morally good
outcome, as I shall now demonstrate.
Consider a scenario in which S is told that he has to select one of his two children to
be killed. If he refuses to choose then both will be killed. In Young (2016) I referred to
this as ‘Sophie’s choice’, adding that each available option was immoral and therefore
that S could not be ascribed moral responsibility for any of the outcomes that followed.
Even if we leave aside the fact that it is immoral to intentionally restrict possible
outcomes to those in which at least one child dies, where an alternate possibility could
have been made available in which no child dies, it is nevertheless informative to
examine this example further. Let us call S’s selecting a child to be killed the ‘action’
option, and S’s refusal to do this the ‘inaction’ option. The outcome of the ‘action’
option is that an equal number of children are saved as are killed. In the ‘inaction’
option, both children are killed. This means that inaction allows more children to be
killed than are saved: an outcome I have already identified as unequivocally immoral.
Now, given a choice between action and inaction, is not the best option ‘action’?
To illustrate: suppose S is told that both of his children are to be killed unless he presses
a button in front of him. Pressing the button randomly lights up one of the children,
thereby identifying that child as the one to be either saved or killed.Which it is depends on
which outcome has been randomly assigned. Beforehand, S knows neither which child the
button will light up nor the randomized outcome (kill or not kill); he knows only that as a
result of pressing the button one child will be killed and one will be saved. Under the
circumstances, which includes the ‘action’ option’s relation to ‘inaction’ (not pressing the
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button, meaning both will be killed), not only is ‘action’ (pushing the button) morally
superior to ‘inaction’ but it is the morally correct thing to do. This is not to say that killing
the same number of children as are saved is, unequivocally, a morally good thing to do –
because there are alternate possibilities that are morally superior to this – but it is the
morally correct thing to do, here, given the options available.
That said, the scenario just described (involving the pressing of a button and
randomized killing) is not representative of ‘Sophie’s choice’. In a genuine ‘Sophie’s
choice’ situation, there are in fact two decisions to make, perhaps masquerading as one.
The first decision is whether one should select ‘action’ or ‘inaction’. Given the choice, I
would say that ‘action’ is the morally correct option to select, for the reasons discussed.
But that is not the end of the matter. Having rejected ‘inaction’ – owing to its
unequivocal immoral status – S has a further choice to make. Yet each remaining
option is equivalent to the other: one child lives and one child dies (not an unequiv-
ocally good thing, morally). Ceteris paribus, the choice S has left, because there are no
alternatives besides that which is unequivocally immoral (i.e., inaction which allows
both to be killed) means that any choice S intentionally makes (as opposed to tossing a
coin, for example, which is not permitted in a genuine ‘Sophie’s choice’) must be based
on some non-morally relevant feature of the children. This is unlike the scenario where
S chooses to press the button because, in that situation, S did not actually select anyone;
rather, a random selection was made which was not based on any characteristics of the
children at all (moral or otherwise). Making a selection which has moral consequences
(i.e., kill or save) based on non-morally relevant characteristics is an immoral thing to
do (Patridge 2013). Given that this is necessarily the outcome of S’s further intentional
choice within the ‘action’ option; and given that the only other alternate possibility is
unequivocally immoral (the already rejected ‘inaction’ option), S has no alternate
possibility available to him that is not immoral. Now, what is interesting about this
example is that the ‘action’ option, in not being unequivocally immoral, is morally
superior to the ‘inaction’ option; but, even so, each outcome available within the
‘action’ option can (and should) be justifiably identified as immoral.
Recall PAP(s)*: S is morally responsible and thus praiseworthy or blameworthy for
E if S could have done something clearlymorally superior or clearly morally inferior
to E. (Coren 2017, p.6]
In doing E (qua ‘action’), S could have done something morally inferior to E
(namely, ‘inaction’). Does this mean S should be ascribed morally responsibility?
No, I do not believe so. This is because PAP(s)* does not state that E must be morally
superior or inferior to ‘other than E’; rather, E has to be clearly morally superior or
inferior in order for S to be ascribed moral responsibility. Presumably, this means that
outcome E (irrespective of which child S selects), in not being clearly morally superior
to ‘other than E’, ought to be identified as immoral (the same as ‘other than E’). In other
words, although the outcomes differ by some indeterminate degree, they do not differ in
kind, insofar as each outcome is of the ‘immoral’ kind.2 As such, S should not be
2 An outcome that is unequivocally immoral compared to one that is not unequivocally immoral means that
there is some difference between them (they differ by some indeterminate degree; say, in terms of the number
of alternate possibilities they are not morally superior to: all compared to some), but are still of the same
immoral kind.
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ascribed moral responsibility. Yet this is the same conclusion as one should draw when
applying PAP(s), as no alternate possibility is available that is not immoral (therefore,
there is no alternative available that is the moral inverse of the current options). Thus,
even though E is morally superior to ‘other than E’, given that it is not clearly morally
superior and therefore does not achieve the status of ‘moral’, both PAP(s) and PAP(s)*
would draw the same conclusion: namely, that S in a ‘Sophie’s choice’ situation should
not be ascribed moral responsibility. Likewise, in Case 1, if we interpret PAP(s)* as
identifying ‘inaction’ as being clearly morally superior to ‘action’ then S should be
ascribed moral responsibility; and where one equates ‘clearly morally superior’ with
morally correct (or praiseworthy), PAP(s) would, again, draw the same conclusion. Of
course, one may argue that, in Case 1, S’s inaction is not clearly morally superior to
‘action’. If it is not clearly morally superior, and ‘action’ is unequivocally immoral,
then, according to PAP(s)*, S should not be ascribed moral responsibility (because both
outcomes must be, I contend, immoral). Once again, under this interpretation, PAP(s)
would conclude the exact same thing: namely, S should not be ascribed moral
responsibility.
1.3 Case 2
I now turn to a further example used to support Objection 1.
Case 2: S has a choice as to whether S brushes S’s teeth for 1 min and 25 s, 1 min
and 26 s, 1 min and 27 s, or 1 min and 28 s. S knows all of this and decides to
brush S’s teeth for 1 min and 27 s. (Coren 2017, p.4)
In Case 2, Coren applies PAP(s) to the example of brushing one’s teeth for
different amounts of time (1 min 25, 26, 27 or 28 s) but also to whether one
chooses to use a blue or black pen, or select red or green grapes. In each example,
S has at least one alternate possibility that is not immoral; therefore, each scenario
enables S to select an option that is not immoral, as required by Young (2016).
Prima facie Coren is correct to state that PAP(s) is satisfied in each example and so
(according to PAP(s)) S should be ascribed moral responsibility. Coren is also
correct to assert that ascribing moral responsibility is not warranted on any of the
occasions described by Case 2.
The amendment I have already introduced to the definition of alternate possibilities
should, however, provide an adequate response to the objection raised by Case 2
(which Coren again uses to support the claim that PAP(s) allows too broad an ascription
of moral responsibility). Given that it is now the case that ‘alternate possibilities’
requires that at least one alternative is the moral inverse of whatever else is available,
S should not be ascribed moral responsibility for whichever teeth brushing option he
selects (or whether he chooses a blue or black pen or red or green grapes), because there
is no moral inverse option available. Importantly, though, one could reasonably declare
that there are no options available in any of these examples that are moral/immoral,
only amoral. The notion of a moral inverse is therefore not applicable. But this is no
different to saying that, in relation to PAP(s)*, E is neither morally superior nor inferior
to ‘other than E’. As such, in the same way that, under PAP(s)*, one would claim that S
should not be ascribed moral responsibility – because E (in being amoral) is not clearly
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morally superior or inferior to ‘other than E’ (which is also amoral) – so E is not the
moral inverse of ‘other than E’, as demanded by the new definition of alternate
possibilities associated with PAP(s). Given this, S should likewise not be ascribed moral
responsibility.
Case 2 highlights the need to stipulate what in Young (2016) I had merely assumed:
that the options under discussion must have moral aptness. In other words, alternate
possibilities must be of moral relevance insofar as they are capable of being judged
moral or immoral in the context in which they are situated.3 All of the examples used in
relation to Case 2 do not have moral aptness. There is therefore no need to apply PAP(s)
or PAP(s)* (for that matter) to these situations, even though each would correctly
conclude that S should not be ascribed moral responsibility.
2 Response to Objection 2
In Objection 2 Coren claims that by no longer requiring that an alternate possibility is
necessary for moral responsibility, my proposal in Young (2016) misses the point of the
original formulation of PAP. As he states:
It is prima facie extremely plausible to say that a necessary condition for S’s
moral responsibility for E is that S could have done something clearly better or
clearly worse than E. (Coren 2017, p.7; emphasis in original)
While it is true that a lack of alternate possibilities necessitates S’s action, it would
be erroneous to conclude from this that having a choice would have caused S to act
differently: for there is an important distinction to be made between S doing E only
because he had no choice and S doing E even though he had no choice (which, of
course, Frankfurt is aware of in his original paper). An alternate possibility means that
we do not have to wonder whether S would have acted differently if an alternate
(morally inverse) outcome had been available. Its presence therefore prevents us from
having to give S the benefit of the doubt. Importantly, though, PAP(s) does not remove
the need (the necessity) for an alternate possibility in some form; rather, it removes the
need to make necessary the clause that S ‘could have done otherwise’ on this occasion.
Where S could have done otherwise (in accordance with my amended definition of
alternate possibilities) then S should be ascribed moral responsibility. PAP(s), therefore
accords with our moral intuition at least in this regard. Where S could not have done
otherwise on a given occasion then the TWC provides a further means of assessing
whether he should be ascribed moral responsibility by comparing S in W1 (where he
could not have done otherwise) with S in W2 (where he could). The TWC therefore
maintains a role for alternate possibilities by comparing what S is able to do on a given
occasion with what he would have done if an alternate outcome had been available.
Through the TWC, one is able to measure the level of congruence between S’s actions
3 Of course, options identified as amoral in one context – e.g., choosing to eat either a croissant or a Danish
pastry – may well be considered moral in a different context where a further option is immoral (e.g., eating a
person).
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in W1 and W2. Coren seeks clarification on the role of congruence within the TWC. I
aim to provide this clarification now.
Coren’s concern over the role of congruence stems from his view that there may be
occasions when S does something that is not obviously moral or immoral, as the Case 1
example involving the train tries to illustrate (see also Case 3 below). Yet as I have
already argued, in Case 1, S is presented with an unequivocally immoral option
(‘action’) and a moral option (‘inaction’). The ‘inaction’ option is not unequivocally
moral because there are possible alternatives that are morally superior, only unavailable
to S. Therefore, S’s inaction is moral relative to the context in which it occurs. This
being the case, PAP(s) is able to ascribe moral responsibility to S. Therefore, the TWC is
not needed. Instead, it is employed only when PAP(s) is not satisfied and so moral
responsibility cannot be ascribed based on its criteria.
To illustrate, consider an example where PAP(s) is not satisfied. Recall the driver
who must steer her vehicle down one of three roads, where each manoeuvre will result
in the vehicle hitting and killing a pedestrian. Under such conditions, the driver has
only immoral options available, and therefore PAP(s) is not satisfied. So we must turn to
the TWC.
If S steers straight ahead in W1 (killing a pedestrian) and does the same in W2, even
though inW2 a fourth road is available free of pedestrians, then S’s action across worlds
is congruent. S should be ascribed moral responsibility and blamed in both worlds. If S
instead steers right in W2 (killing a different pedestrian) then while I accept that the
action (literally what was done) across worlds is not the same, it nevertheless remains
the case that the outcome of each distinct action is congruent, morally, as both actions
are immoral. In such a situation, S in both worlds should again be ascribed moral
responsibility and blamed. Where S in W2 steers down the fourth (pedestrian free) road,
not only does her action differ to that of W1 but it is incongruent, morally with the W1
outcome. It therefore shows that S would have chosen a moral outcome if one had been
available. Unlike the previous two examples, in this situation, S should not be ascribed
moral responsibility in W1 (but should be in W2 and praised).
2.1 Case 3
Coren presents a final example to challenge PAP(s), and in particular the coherence of
the role played by congruence within the TWC.
Case 3: In W1, S does E: S neither donates to a very good charity, X, nor steals
from X. In W1, S did not have alternate possibilities that were clearly morally
superior or inferior to E. InW2, S can steal up to ten thousand dollars from X, or S
can choose to donate up to ten thousand dollars to X. In W2, S does E: S neither
donates nor steals. (Coren 2017, p.8)
The first thing to note about Case 3 is that it is not clear what S actually does in W1,
only what he does not do. It is quite possible that every day of S’s life he does not do
the two things described in Case 3. Yet knowing this to be true still leaves us none the
wiser about S’s action E in W1, even though there are an indeterminate number of
things S could be doing at time t1 (in W1) that are perfectly compatible with him
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not donating to a very good charity, X, or with him not stealing from it, including being
in a permanent vegetative state. All we know is that S lacked morally superior or
inferior options to E in W1. As such, one is left to wonder about the extent to which
whatever S is doing (in conjunction with the things we are told he is not doing) has
moral aptness. In the absence of moral aptness, there is no need to employ PAP(s) and
therefore the TWC. Nevertheless, let us engage with the point I believe Coren is
making with regard to the use of the TWC and the congruence (or lack thereof)
between worlds.
Suppose that whenever S is about to decide to do something morally good (e.g.,
donate a large sum of money to charity) or something morally bad (e.g., steal money
from a charity), Black intervenes (using his neurological devise) to prevent S from
deciding and hence from actually doing the morally good or bad thing. Given this, S
has no alternate possibility available to him that allows an outcome that is the moral
inverse of what he actually does (call this situation W1); although, to reiterate, one
could argue that S’s Bgoing about his business^ (whatever that involves), by doing
neither morally good or bad things, means that S’s action lacks moral aptness. On the
other hand, S going about his business may be considered a morally good thing to do in
the context of a morally bad alternative or a morally bad thing to do in the context of a
morally good alternative (where these are available in W2).
4 What Coren is concerned
with in Case 3, however, when stipulating that S does the same thing in W2 as in W1
(i.e., action E: neither donating to the charity nor stealing from it), where morally
inferior or superior options are available (stealing from or donating to a charity), is
whether we should (a) hold S morally responsible for his action and (b) morally praise
or blame him for what he does.
Given that S’s action in W1 and W2 is the same, S should be held morally
responsible for his action in both W1 and W2. This conclusion is consistent with the
role played by TWC because, in Case 3, Coren has contrived that at least one alternate
possibility is the moral inverse of another (i.e., stealing and not stealing). That said,
what remains to be decided is whether S should be morally praised or blamed for doing
what he did (action E), which amounts neither to stealing from nor donating to the
charity. What Coren wants to say is that, intuitively, despite the congruence of S’s
action across worlds, S should be neither praised nor blamed for what he has done
(option E). In contrast, I see no problem with saying that S can be both praised and
admonished for doing E, at least where the options available (‘other than E’) are viable
options. To illustrate what I mean, let us say that every day I neither steal from the local
charity shop nor do I donate to charity. But, equally, I do not consider that there has
ever been a viable opportunity for me to steal from the charity shop, nor, owing to my
utter lack of disposable income (let us allow), do I consider donating to charity to be a
viable option. In contrast, for the alternate possibilities described in W2 to be genuine
possibilities, they must be viable options.
Returning to Case 3, then, suppose a member of the charity accidently left a cash
donation where S could easily have stolen it undetected. In W2, we can allow that S had
a viable opportunity to steal but did not. As far as the TWC is concerned, job done (so
4 There is a problem with the scenario I have just described involving Black’s intervention. What would Black
do in the context of Coren’s Case 1 where (I have argued) S can only do something morally good or morally
bad. Let us leave that issue aside, however, as it does not concern the point Coren is making with Case 3.
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to speak), moral responsibility can be assigned on the basis of this one alternate
possibility (which is the main concern of PAP(s) and the TWC) and praise (in this case)
administered. But, equally, S did not donate to the charity, which was another option.5
What concerns us, here, is whether we should be more morally obliged not to steal than
we should be morally obliged to donate to charity. As I mentioned previously, I see no
inconsistency in praising S for not stealing whilst also admonishing him for not
donating to charity, providing each of these is a viable option.
To further illustrate how one could ascribe moral responsibility whilst also varying
one’s degree of praise (say, by assigning a mixture of praise and admonishment),
consider the following (final) example: Donald is a billionaire who finds himself on
a TV quiz show. As part of the show, Donald has to select one box from a series of
numbered boxes. Inside the box Donald selects is a card informing him that he has been
awarded £1000 prize money. He is also told that he has two options: (i) keep the
money, or (ii) keep half the money and give the other half to charity. Intuitively, the
situation as described satisfies the requirements of PAP(s) – because it contains one
contextualized immoral option and one contextualized moral option – and so Donald
should be ascribed moral responsibility for whichever decision he makes. In line with
our intuition, he should be praised for selecting (ii) and admonished if he selects (i).
Now suppose, instead, that Donald has available to him numerous options. He could (i)
keep all the money, (ii) give 50% away (to charity), (iii) give 75% away, (iv) give 99%
away, or (v) give it all away. Suppose Donald chooses (iv). Is (iv) clearly morally
inferior to (v) or clearly morally superior to (iii) or (ii)? To be fair, I believe, this is a
point Coren is trying to make by way of a criticism of PAP(s) and even PAP(s)*. But, in
doing so, the focus has shifted from whether moral responsibility should be ascribed to
S – which remains the case even with the increase in options available – to how much S
should be praised or admonished, given that he is morally responsible.
First and foremost, the role of PAP(s), in conjunction with TWC (where necessary),
is to determine whether moral responsibility should be ascribed to Donald (in this case).
Typically, where Donald selects an option identified as moral he should be praised;
where he selects an immoral option he should be admonished. Is it immoral for a
billionaire to keep all of the £1000 lb prize money? Is it morally good for him to keep
only half and give the rest to charity? Is it morally better to give away 75% and better
still to give away 99%, and is the best thing for him to do, morally, to give it all away?
What is required for the ascription of moral responsibility is for at least one option to be
the moral inverse of whatever else is available. If one decides that keeping all of the
money is immoral (although I recognize that some readers may require a defence of this
claim) and if one considers more than one option to be moral, and S selects one of the
moral options, then there is no inconsistency in saying that giving half of the prize
money to charity is a morally good thing to do (compared to keeping all of it) and S
should be praised for that, while also accepting that giving away 75% would have been
better and therefore deserving of more praise, while 99% would have been better still,
and giving all of it away deserves the most praise.
5 In Coren’s original Case 3, if in W2 S decided to donate to charity then presumably this meant he did not
steal, although the two are not mutually exclusive. After all, one could contrive that S stole the original
donation and then returned it to the charity, not as the original donation (that he could claim to have found) but
as a new donation from himself (perhaps so that he would look good to others). Of course, one may discount
this as a genuine donation, given that it was stolen money.
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3 Conclusion
I concede that in Young (2016) the definition of alternate possibilities was imprecise
because it was focused on providing an alternate possibility to an immoral outcome.
Coren is therefore correct to point this out. I consider my amended definition to be
able to withstand Coren’s objections. I further concede that Coren’s amended version
of PAP(s) (his (PAP(s)*) is correct to highlight the relativity at play when comparing
moral outcomes: that some are morally superior or inferior to others, and necessarily
so, for the ascription of moral responsibility. Nevertheless, I consider the reasoning
underlying PAP(s) to endorse this relativity, even though it is not made explicit within
PAP(s)’s formulation. Having said that, I believe that it is important to identify
outcomes in moral or immoral terms, and I say this while accepted that such statuses
may well be context dependent (the exception being outcomes that are unequivocally
moral or immoral). Ultimately, this must be done if one is to distinguish an outcome
that is clearly morally superior or inferior from one that is not: for it is my view that
the term ‘clearly’ is marking out a different moral kind, identifiable in terms of its
status as either moral or immoral relative to the context in which it occurs (again,
accepting the caveat that relates to unequivocal outcomes). Finally, I consider PAP(s)
to be in keeping with our intuitions about being able to do otherwise; but also
consider being able to do otherwise to be subtly different to necessarily drawing on
alternate possibilities for the ascription of moral responsibility, which is why I
consider either PAP(s) or TWC to be necessary, rather than PAP itself. I also hope
to have clarified the role congruence plays when employing the TWC. Congruence
relies on outcomes being identified as moral or immoral in addition to their relative
status as superior or inferior to something else.
In conclusion, then, what I hope to have done is present a defence of PAP(s) and
TWC while also amending these in response to Coren’s comments. My amended
version of PAP(s) now reads as follows:
PAP(s) Where E and ‘other than E’ have moral-aptness, S is morally responsible for
doing E if S could have done ‘other than E’, where doing ‘other than E’ consists in
having available at least one alternate possibility that is the moral inverse of E.
Identifying an outcome as moral or immoral does not require that the outcome is
unequivocally moral (which would require that no ‘other than E’ option, whether
available or not, is morally superior to E) or unequivocally immoral (which would
require that no ‘other than E’ option, whether available or not, is morally inferior to
E). It requires only that E and ‘other than E’ are the moral inverse of each other,
relative to each other. Where no alternate possibility (‘other than E’) is available, as
described, then PAP(s) is not satisfied. S will therefore only be ascribed moral
responsibility if the TWC is satisfied. The TWC has also been amended slightly, so
that it now reads:
TWC Where E and ‘other than E’ have moral-aptness, and where S’s action E in world
W1 (a world without alternate possibilities) and S’s action E in twin world W2 (which
differs from W1 only insofar as it is a world with an alternate possibility) are congruent
in terms of moral outcome but not necessarily in terms of action, then S in either world
is morally responsible for E.
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